Scholarship Repository
University of Minnesota Law School
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1991

Defendant Amenability to Treatment or Probation as a Basis for
Departure Under the Minnesota and Federal Sentencing
Guidelines
Richard Frase
University of Minnesota Law School, frase001@umn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard Frase, Defendant Amenability to Treatment or Probation as a Basis for Departure Under the
Minnesota and Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 3 FED. SENTENCING R. 328 (1991), available at
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/515.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in the Faculty Scholarship collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

328

Federal Sentencing Reporter: May / June 1991

COMMENTARY
DEFENDANT AMENABILITY TO
TREATMENT OR PROBATION AS A
BASIS FOR DEPARTURE UNDER
THE MINNESOTA AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Richard S. Frase*
Federal courts are divided on the question of
whether guidelines departures may be based on
offender characteristics such as the defendant's
amenability to treatment.' Courts rejecting such
departures have concluded that sentencing under the
guidelines should be based primarily on the offense,
not the offender, and should give little weight to
rehabilitative goals.2 Courts accepting such departures point out that the Sentencing Reform Act
explicitly recognizes the relevance of offender
characteristics and rehabilitative goals and that the
Sentencing Commission has not ruled
out such
3
factors, at least in exceptional cases.
In resolving these issues, Federal judges, attorneys and interested observers should consider the
experience of states which have adopted sentencing
guidelines. Minnesota's experience is of particular
interest, since its guidelines have been in effect since
1980, and have generated a large body of appellate
caselaw. Minnesota's Commission expressly
4
premised its guidelines on a theory of "just deserts."
Despite this emphasis, appellate courts have repeatedly upheld the application of offender-based,
treatment-oriented considerations-not only in
choosing the sentence within the applicable guidelines range but also as a basis for departure. Minnesota's experience thus suggests that departures based
on amenability to treatment or probation are
compatible with a guideline scheme, even one based
on retributive goals.
This article describes the three leading Minnesota
amenability departure cases, and then analyzes
Federal cases which have accepted or rejected similar
departures. It concludes that such departures-if
limited to exceptional cases-are justified under both
the Minnesota and the Federal guidelines. The
comparison reveals identical theories of amenability,
even though Minnesota and Federal courts never cite
each other. This remarkable parallelism suggests
that Federal and state judges have much to learn
from each other's decisions.
I. THE MINNESOTA AMENABILITY CASES
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines 5 establish
presumptive rules governing the use and duration of
imprisonment, applicable to each combination of
offense severity and criminal history. Parole release
has been abolished, but good-conduct credits may
*Richard S. Frase is Professor of Law, University of
Minnesota Law School.

reduce prison terms by up to one-third. The trial
court may depart from the presumptive sentence if it
demonstrates that "substantial and compelling
circumstances" make a departure sentence
"more
6
appropriate, reasonable or equitable."
The guidelines state that all traditional punishment goals-including rehabilitation-may be
considered when a court is selecting conditions of a
non-prison sentence.7 However, the guidelines do
not specify the purposes of punishment which may
be used to justify departures. The list of aggravating
and mitigating factors which may serve as reasons
for departure focuses on offense severity and culpability, but this list is nonexclusive. Punishment purposes are not included in the separate list of factors
which may not be used to justify departure (e.g., race,
employment history, education, marital status). The
enabling statute makes no mention of purposes of
punishment, although the Minnesota criminal code
recognizes all traditional sentencing goals.8
Faced with this ambiguity, trial courts began to
depart for utilitarian as well as retributive reasons.
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected departures
based on assessments of offender dangerousness and
need for deterrence, 9 but upheld departures under
several theories of offender "amenability" to prison
0
or probation. The first case was State v. Park,"
which
affirmed an upward departure (to prison, in lieu of
the presumptive non-prison term) because the
defendant was "unamenable to probation." The trial
court's finding of unamenability was based on the
strong recommendation of the probation officer,
supported by evidence of defendant's serious
chemical dependency problem, his refusal to accept
that he had a problem or needed treatment, and his
complete failure to cooperate during an earlier adult
probation sentence.
In State v. Wright," the Supreme Court upheld a
downward departure (six months in jail, followed by
treatment, instead of two years in prison) based on
two "amenability" theories. First, the Court found
that the defendant was "particularly unamenable to
prison;" a court-appointed psychiatrist had strongly
opposed incarceration, saying that Wright was
"more child than man" and would be seriously
abused in prison and/or led into criminal activity by
other prisoners.12 Second, the defendant was
"particularly amenable to individualized treatment
in a probationary setting;" he needed psychiatric care
which was not available in any institution, and he
would not endanger others provided he received
appropriate out-patient treatment.
Another amenability theory was recognized in
State v. Trog3 The trial court had imposed a six
month jail sentence in lieu of the presumptive twoyear prison term for burglary with assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that departure was
properly based on defendant's "particular amenability to individualized treatment in a probationary
setting." No mention was made of Trog's need for
or receptivity to any particular form of treatment.
Instead, the Supreme Court emphasized the aberra-
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tional nature of the crime: Trog had previously been
an "outstanding citizen," had no police record, had
done well in school, had an excellent work record,
was intoxicated during the crime, had cooperated
with the police, and was extremely contrite. Among
those who testified at the sentencing hearing was a
retired chief of the police juvenile division who concluded that in this "very special case" nothing would
be served by sending Trog to prison. The Court
seemed to be saying that, in spite of his serious crime,
Trog was a good person for whom lengthy imprisonment would be unnecessary or even harmful.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has never explained how these amenability departures relate to
the text and "just deserts" theory of the guidelines.
However, as I have argued elsewhere,'14 these departures are supported by strong practical and policy
arguments. The Minnesota guidelines' heavy use of
presumptive non-prison sentences, backed up by the
threat of revocation, implies a theory of limiting
retributivism: most defendants initially receive less
than they "deserve." The guidelines rules specifying
the appropriateness of initially imposing a prison or
a non-prison term reflect presumptions of suitability
for probation, which can be overcome in exceptional
cases. Allowing such departures permits more
efficient use of limited resources, and lessens the
temptation for judges and prosecutors to use their
discretionary powers of probation revocation and
plea bargaining to achieve the same results informally. Given these substantial, unregulated discretionary powers, formal recognition of amenability
departures does not significantly reduce sentencing
uniformity and proportionality; instead, it encourages officials to make these decisions more openly,
stating reasons.
II. THE FEDERAL AMENABILITY CASES
The Federal sentencing guidelines, like those in
Minnesota, provide presumptive prison terms for 15
each combination of offense and criminal history,
but allow courts to depart in "atypical" cases.' 6 The
enabling statute provides
that the sentencing court
17
may depart if it finds
"that there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines that should result in a sentence
different from [the guidelines]."
This language has been interpreted to raise two
distinct legal issues: (1) Are the trial court's asserted
grounds for departure legally permissible (i.e., not
"adequately" considered by the Commission)? (2) If
so, are these grounds "of sufficient importance8 and
magnitude" that a departure "should result"?
As in Minnesota, Federal departure standards do
not indicate which purposes of punishment may
justify a departure, and lower Federal courts differ
widely. They do, however, agree that all purposes of
punishment may be considered in choosing the specific sentence within the applicable guideline range. 9

As for departures, several Courts of Appeal have
rejected consideration of offender-related concepts
such as rehabilitative potential and good (or bad)
character, stating that sentencing under the guidelines should be based on the crime, not the offender.2" As explained below, however, the actual
holdings of some cases are narrower, and many
Federal courts now expressly accept "amenability"
departures analogous to those recognized in Wright
and Trog.2' Moreover, there is substantial support in
the guidelines and the enabling statute for the
application of such offender factors.
The Introduction to the guidelines states that
their purpose is to bring greater honesty, uniformity,
and proportionality to Federal sentencing. 22 Both
uniformity (treating like cases alike) and proportionality ("appropriately different sentences for criminal
conduct of different severity") 23 imply a retributive,
offense-oriented theory. However, the Introduction
later states that the Commission decided to base its
initial rules primarily on pre-guidelines sentencing
practices (which recognized all traditional sentencsingle "just deserts" or
ing goals), and rejected 2any
"crime control" model. 4
In any case, the enabling statute provides unequivocal support for consideration of offender characteristics and utilitarian goals. 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)
requires the sentencing court to consider not only the
offense but also "the history and characteristics of
the defendant;" the court must further consider all
four traditional purposes of punishment: retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and "the need to provide
the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner." The Senate
Report states that the drafters had "deliberately not
shown a preference for one purpose of sentencing
over another." 25 The Report further specifies that the
goal of rehabilitation is important not only in setting
conditions of probation, but also "in determining
whether a sanction other than a term of imprisonment is appropriate in a particular case." 26 Another
statute, 18 U.S.C. §3661, provides that "no limitation
shall be placed on the information concerning the
[defendant's] background, character, and conduct"
which the sentencing court may consider. Recognizing these statutory mandates, Section 1B1.4 provides
that, unless otherwise prohibited by law, courts may
consider any such information in determining what
sentence to impose within the guideline range or
whether a departure is warranted.
A. "Particular amenability to treatment"
The First Circuit has indicated in a series of cases
that it would accept departures based on a Wrighttype "treatable-only-on-probation" theory. Although rejecting departures on the facts presented,
the court stated that departure would be appropriate
where the defendant has "a special need for, and receptiveness to, treatment," and the Bureau of Prisons
does not have adequate treatment services meeting
the defendant's needs. 27 Presumably, the First Cir-
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cuit would also require, as in Wright, that treatment
outside prison poses no great risk to public safety."8
Several Federal district courts have gone further
and upheld probationary departures based on defendant's amenability to treatment without any showing
that an adequate program was unavailable in prison. 29 These rulings reflect a preference for community treatment that is supported by Congress' clearly
expressed belief that rehabilitation cannot be reliably
induced in prison.3 Such a preference might also be
justified under the "parsimony of punishment" principle found in Section 3553(a): the sentence should be
"sufficient, but not greater than necessary," to
achieve the four traditional goals of punishment.
On the other hand, it could be argued that treatment within prison is preferable, so as to insure
"sufficient" retribution, deterrence, and/or public
protection. But if community treatment would be
safe and more effective, or if the defendant has
already completed most of his treatment, poses no
further danger to the public, and would be more
likely to relapse if sent to prison, the balance ought to
shift back in favor of probation.3 ' Such exceptional
probation sentences pose minimal risks of recidivism
or lost deterrence; they are also consistent with a
theory of "limiting retributivism," similar to that
underlying the Minnesota Guidelines: 32 defendants
may not be given more than they "deserve," but they
may sometimes be given less if this will promote
important rehabilitative goals.
Courts which have rejected departures based on
amenability to treatment have often done so on
grounds that the particular facts of the case were
simply not "atypical" enough to overcome the 33
presumption in favor of the guideline sentence.
Other courts have appeared to categorically reject all
such departures. In U.S. v. Van Dyke, 34 the Fourth
Circuit held that defendant's participation in two
drug treatment programs after his arrest was equivalent to "acceptance of responsibility" ("A/R"),
which was "adequately considered" by the Commission; sentence mitigation must therefore be limited to
the two-level A/R adjustment.
There is certainly some similarity between amenability considerations and acceptance of responsibility, but these concepts are not the same thing. If the
A/R adjustment is granted routinely to defendants
35
who plead guilty, as a "plea inducing discount,"
then it has nothing to do with the defendant's need
for and receptiveness to treatment. Even if A/R
requires something more than a guilty plea-even if it
requires sincere remorse 36-- it still does not necessarily imply amenability to treatment. Defendants may
fully admit and regret their crimes, without admitting
the underlying causes of their criminality or making
a commitment to address those causes. This is
especially true where the crime pled to is not closely
related to the problems needing treatment; accordingly, the Third Circuit has declined to apply the Van
Dyke rule in such cases.3 7 The First and Seventh
Circuits have suggested a further limit on Van Dyke:
even if the A/R reduction normally precludes any

further reduction based on post-arrest rehabilitation,
such reduction may be permissible in those rare cases
where rehabilitation "is so extraordinary as to
suggest its presence to a degree not adequately taken
into consideration by the A/R reduction."3"
39
In U.S. v. Pharr,
the Third Circuit held that
departure based on defendant's post-arrest efforts to
overcome his addiction was barred by the Chapter
5H policy statements relating to offender characteristics. The Court conceded that these policy statements
are generally not binding on courts, but chose to
follow them anyway. The Court then held that the
departure was barred by the §5H1.4 policy statement
on drug and alcohol dependence. If such dependence is never a basis for mitigation, reasoned the
court, then neither is separation from such dependence. Otherwise, only those with the dependence
could receive leniency; the result would be to reward
offenders not only for overcoming
their dependence,
40
but also for being addicted.
A very different interpretation of this policy
statement was adopted in U.S. v. Harrington.41 The
district court noted that §5H1.4 states that "substance
abuse is highly correlated to an increased propensity
to commit crime." The implication, argued the
Court, is that if successful drug treatment reduces
such propensities, it thereby reduces the need for the
lengthy periods of incarceration provided for drug
offenses under the guidelines.42
The Third Circuit's Pharrdecision also held that
departure was barred by the policy statements
(§§5H1.2 and 5H1.5) relating to educational skills and
employment. According to the Court, Pharr's
conduct in seeking treatment was analogous to a
defendant's efforts to improve himself through
education or steady work, which the Commission
had rejected as grounds for departure. This analogy
seems a bit strained, since these policy statements do
not mention self-improvement efforts at all. Even if
that was the intent, it is not true that the Commission
absolutely "rejected" factors like education and
employment; the policy statements provide that these
factors are not "ordinarily" relevant, which implies
that they are relevant in exceptional cases.43 It could
also be argued that these offender characteristics may
always be considered, not as separate items meriting
departure, but rather as evidence of broader character traits such as amenability to treatment."
Both Van Dyke and Pharrcould have been decided
on much narrower grounds, and were arguably
correctly decided on their facts. In Van Dyke, the
government had argued that defendant's involvement in treatment during pretrial detention was a
highly suspect "foxhole conversion," but the court
chose to assume defendant's sincerity for purposes of
the appeal. Such post-arrest conduct is very difficult
to assess, especially where (as is often the case) the
defendant is required to participate in treatment
under the terms of pretrial release. 4 In both Wright
and Trog, the findings of "amenability to treatment"
were based largely on pre-arrest conduct and
offender characteristics. A further problem in Van
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Dyke was the trial court's conclusory finding that46
"the defendant is trying to rehabilitate himself.
In Pharr,defendant had already completed an
inpatient drug program, he was making "conscientious efforts" to overcome his addiction, and a jail
sentence would disrupt his drug treatment. 47 On the
other hand, Pharr's criminal history category was VI
(13 or more points); the defendants in Wright and
Trog had no prior records.
B. Unamenability to prison
The "unusual vulnerability" concept of State v.
Wright finds a direct Federal counterpart in U.S. v.
Lara.48 The guidelines sentence for defendant
Morales' cocaine violation was 121-151 months, but
the trial court imposed only 60 months (the mandatory minimum), based on a finding that defendant
would be sexually attacked in prison unless placed
in solitary confinement. Morales was 22 but "looked
16," and was "delicate-looking" and admittedly
bisexual; he had already encountered attempts by
several "tough" inmates to coerce him into becoming a male prostitute for their profit and enjoyment.
The Second Circuit affirmed the departure, noting
that such extreme vulnerability was not taken into
account by the Commission. As for the policy
statements saying that age as well as mental,
emotional or physical condition are not "ordinarily"
relevant, the Court of Appeals held that the trial
court had relied on these factors not as separate
characteristics meriting departure, but as evidence of
vulnerability. In any case, the trial court could
properly base a departure on such "ordinarily
irrelevant" factors if, as in this case, "they present an
extraordinary situation." Thus, the departure factor
was not adequately considered by the Commission,
and the departure was not unreasonable.
In neither Wright nor Lara did the courts specify
the theory of punishment which made defendant's
unusual vulnerability relevant. In Lara, the government had argued that this factor reflected rehabilitative goals rejected by the guidelines. The Court of
Appeals concluded that even if this factor does
reflect such goals, the departure was valid: the role
of rehabilitation, "although sharply restricted" by
the guidelines, "has not been entirely eliminated
from the sentencing process." 49 It would seem that
departure in a case like Lara is actually more closely
related to retributive values: the term of imprisonment should be scaled down, to compensate for the
unusually punitive impact of a prison sentence
which, through no fault of defendant, might have to
be served entirely in solitary confinement. Other
unusual-vulnerability departures have been based
on both utilitarian and retributive theories. This was
certainly true in Wright, where the departure was
supported by a finding that the defendant would be
victimized and/or led into criminal activity by other
inmates. A similar utilitarian argument was cited in
U.S. v. Rodriguez: jailing the defendant for the
guideline term "would be the cause most likely to
undo his rehabilitation."" °

C. Other Federal amenability departures
In U.S. v. Big Crow"' the Eighth Circuit appeared to
recognize a departure theory analogous to that
applied in State v. Trog: defendant is basically a good
person, and the conviction offense was simply an
aberration.52 Although rejecting the trial court's
reliance on defendant's lack of prior criminal record
and intoxication at the time of the offense, the Court
of Appeals upheld the downward durational
departure, based on defendant's excellent employment record, "solid community ties" (evidenced by
unsolicited letters from community leaders and a
police officer), and "his consistent efforts to overcome the adverse environment of the Pine Ridge
reservation." 13 These facts were found to be
"sufficiently unusual" to justify departure s4
In U.S. v. Carey,55 the Seventh Circuit recognized
a similar "uncharacteristic act" theory, based on
§1A.4(d): "The Commission, of course, has not dealt
with the single acts of aberrant behavior that still
may justify probation at higher offense levels
through departures." However, the Court of
Appeals reversed the departure, on the ground that
the district court was clearly erroneous in finding
that defendant's actions met this standard. It was
not enough, said the Court of Appeals, that Carey's
check-kiting scheme was his first offense, and was
inconsistent with his "otherwise exemplary life and
high standing in the community." The guidelines
expressly bar consideration of defendant's socioeconomic status, and first offender status is relevant
only if the court finds "unusual circumstances," not
considered by the Commission in formulating its
criminal history score.56 Moreover, the "aberrant
act" must be more than just conduct "out of character"-it must be "a spontaneous and seemingly
thoughtless act." 57 Carey's crime was the result of
substantial planning, involving acts spread over a
fifteen-month period.
The "uncharacteristic act" theory was rejected by
the Fifth Circuit in U.S. v. Reed,55 on the ground that
"sentencing under the Guidelines is to be based on
the crime committed, not the offender." As noted
earlier, the guidelines and applicable statutes do not
support so narrow a view of the purposes and
relevant factors in sentencing. As is true of many
cases announcing broad principles, however, it
appears that this case could have been decided on
much narrower grounds. The trial court's only
support for the departure was its brief statement to
the defendant that "there is something good in you."
Even if fully supported, however, the "uncharacteristic act" theory might be criticized as tending to
favor white middle class offenders. But Federal
cases thus far reveal, if anything, the opposite bias: in
Big Crow, this theory was applied in favor of a
socially-disadvantaged Native American defendant,
and other cases suggest that Federal judges are very
unsympathetic to middle class offenders with no
excuse for their crimes.59
Neither Trog nor Federal cases recognizing a
similar "uncharacteristic act" theory have explained
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how this factor relates to punishment goals. The
statement in U.S. v. Carey that such a defendant "is
arguably less accountable," 6° and the social-adversity
factor in Big Crow, suggest a retributive theory. But
if emphasis is placed on the idea that defendant is a
"basically good person" (i.e., cooperative and nondangerous), and if (as in Big Crow) the sentence
includes treatment conditions, the underlying theory
begins to sound more like amenability to treatment
and/or probationary supervision.
CONCLUSION
Despite the Minnesota Commission's emphasis on
"just deserts," the Minnesota amenability departure
cases are consistent with the structure and purposes
of that state's guidelines and make sentencing policy
sense-provided they are limited to exceptional cases.
Very similar departures have been recognized under
the Federal guidelines. These have stronger statutory
support than their Minnesota counterparts, and are
justified by equally strong practical and policy arguments-again, provided that they are limited to exceptional circumstances. The real issue in these cases
is the amount of allowable discretion, not the sentencing theory applied. Purely retributive sentencing, if
allowed free reign to precisely "make the punishment
fit the crime," would involve just as much discretion
(and hence, just as much potential for disparity) as
utilitarian sentencing. Moreover, the difficulty of
pigeon-holing the precise punishment theory underlying the vulnerable-defendant and uncharacteristicact cases suggests that any attempted limitation of
departures to purely "retributive" grounds would be
artificial and easily evaded. Such evasion is a serious
concern, since many Federal judges, like their
Minnesota counterparts, apparently still believe in
utilitarian goals. If sentencing guidelines are too
inflexible in their pursuit of retributive proportionality, they invite subversion, thus undercutting the
goals of honesty and uniformity in sentencing.
Minnesota's experience shows that amenability
departures are consistent with a guidelines scheme,
and can help provide the necessary flexibility to
insure that this important reform succeeds over the
long term. At the same time, the striking similarity
between the independently-derived Minnesota and
Federal amenability doctrines suggests that fundamental issues of sentencing are the same everywhere.
The evolving "common law of sentencing," like its
counterparts in other fields, knows no jurisdictional
bounds.
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